Winning the Peace

This week's attacks in Baghdad, threatening everyone from humanitarian aid workers to the architects of the war have underlined how much remains to be done in Iraq. As the American dead and injured pile up, critics of the war have turned from arguing about the lies used to justify the invasion, to calling for coalition troops to be brought home. I was as against the war as anyone, and these columns have pointed out enough lies and cover ups to at least justify removing the offenders from power, but we need to deal with the situation as it is. Iraq is a mess, and we are collectively responsible for that. That's what "representative democracy" means. Right now, we have a responsibility to the people of Iraq, and that means securing them a peaceful future.

Abandoning Iraq is not an option. We failed to stop the war that our elected leaders wanted. We're there now, and leaving is the worst thing we can do. If we pull out now, the future of Iraq looks pretty certain - civil war. Without the American presence, the Ba-athists are going to try and reclaim power. They will be opposed, at least in the south, by the Islamists, supported - at least covertly - by Iran. In the north, we already have plenty of examples of ethnic fighting - Sunni, Kurds and Turkomani all trying to draw American attention to atrocities perpetrated by the others, while covering up their own murders. Whether such a civil war would be worse than atrocities committed under Hussein is difficult to know, but it seems unlikely that ordinary Iraqis will notice much improvement.

The cost to Iraq of our withdrawal is pretty clear, but what benefit would there be? We would save money, our soldiers would not die. Yet both these costs were clear before the invasion happened. The time to object on this basis is past. Much as we might hate it, we are in Iraq now. We cannot turn the clock back. All we can do is what the Bush administration should have done before the war. We must formulate a meaningful exit strategy.

Simply withdrawing, with minimal damage to our troops, is not enough. We must leave behind a stable Iraq. It has been clear since well before the war that the Bush administration had no idea how to do that. Before the war, they placed their faith in the INC and its self-interested and optimistic reports of populist support. Within days of reaching Baghdad, even they had accepted that the INC could not form a government. Instead, the hawks have fallen back on vague talk of "democracy", "federal", and "interim governments". But not a single concrete suggestion has emerged.

Part of this vagueness is the complete lack of imagination shown by the Bush administration. If their policy is not dictated to them by their buddies in corporate America, they have no ideas. Thus it is no surprise that the only part of the campaign being run with flair and imagination is the part that transfers tax dollars into Bush crony back pockets. Largely, however, Bush has no answers to the Iraq quagmire, because too many of the answers are politically unacceptable.

To understand the Bush attitude to Iraq, you need to look at a map. Draw on it where the oil is, and where the different ethnic and religious groups are. You'll see that much of the oil is in either the north (dominated by several, largely antagonistic ethnic groups, most notably the Kurds and Turkomani) or the south (dominated by Shiites and Islamists). The bulk of the population (dominated by Sunni) are in the middle, along with much of the farmland, but little oil. Worse, all these groups wish to dominate the country, or at least dominate their immediate area as a largely independent state.

The obvious solution would be to allow the different groups this freedom. One superficially attractive idea is dividing Iraq into separate states, largely determining their own government, but bound together by trade agreements and having an overarching federal government acting a court of final appeal and responsible for international relations. The problem is that the local states would be part of any negotiations over oil - which means that America would need to deal with them directly. Unfortunately, the Americans are generally not happy dealing with these people. The Shiites of the south are perceived as prone to extremism, and sharing political sympathies with Iran. The Kurds in the north are politically sensitive - any dealings with them will result in protests from Turkey, still regarded as an important American ally. Turkey is, of course, fearful that legitimising the Kurds on one side of the border will result in uprisings amongst the Kurds oppressed within Turkish borders.

In an ideal world, America would like to deal with the Sunni. They're perceived as being closer to the American norm. Countries dominated by the Sunni tend to be more secular, less outspokenly Islamist. In an ideal world, the Bush administration would like to see a strong Sunni government, one capable of controlling the country. There's just two problems with this. First, the other ethnic and religious groups are unlikely to accept this quietly. A Sunni dominated government would need to be imposed, possibly by force. Which isn't going to play well back home. But the second problem is bigger - the obvious model for a Sunni dominated government is the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. While there is no reason that any new government should resemble Hussein's regime in any way, the comparison will be made by critics, whether Iraqi or American.

Bush is running scared. He needs to create a regime in Iraq that isn't just different, but looks different. It needs to be a regime with greater respect for human rights and democracy. It needs to be acceptable to the Iraqi people, despite their widely differing political ambitions. It needs to not upset America's allies in the region, nor aid the spread of fundamentalist Islam. Which is a contradictory set of requirements bordering on the impossible. So instead, Bush will prevaricate. After 2004, he has nothing to lose - he'll be re-elected, and impeachment seems unlikely. Iraq can be trailed along until either the media lose interest, or it becomes someone else's problem.

While such a solution is good for Bush, it isn't for anyone else. Iraq needs stability, America needs troops not to die. That's only going to happen if Bush bites the bullet, and accepts that needs other than his (and his close friends) own have priority. A federal solution is going to be the answer, but not, perhaps, in the way that most hawks believe. The American model of relatively weak states with a relatively strong central government is a recipe for disaster. Iraqis have (for good reason) too much distrust of strong central governments to accept one whose ideology they don't strongly agree with. Instead, most control will need to be concentrated in the hands of local states who have some hope of governing with an informed consensus of the populous. The country needs to be kept together by a central government that acts as a final court of appeal, by a series of trade agreements, and by diplomatic pressure - including international trade and aid - to maintain the co-operation.

Of course, strengthening the individual groups within Iraq may lead to the eventual break up of the country. The Shiite south has more in common with Iran than with its fellow Iraqis. Dividing the country in the north could provide a nucleus for an independent Kurdistan. The Sunni centre could be left without access to the sea, and wondering whether its fortunes would be better tied to those of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Syria. None of which might be ideal for America, which would love to be able to negotiate with a single, grateful, secular government in charge of all that oil. But even at worse, the break up of Iraq would be slow and controlled. Better yet, Iraqi security and American withdrawal would be achieved in the fastest possible time. Everyone - bar a few oil barons - would win.

Peace in Iraq is possible. It requires America to surrender control over the country, but that would damage no one beyond a few American corporate barons. It requires accepting that dividing the country amongst its disparate groups is largely inevitable. A controlled hand over of power could begin now, swiftly leading to a withdrawal of the majority of American troops. That the Bush administration hasn't made any significant progress says much about their priorities.

Graham Robinson. 29th November 2003.

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